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Public insurance adjusters should be allowed to practice anywhere in the country. At
present, forty-four states, plus the District of Columbia, specifically permit public adjusting
activities and regulate the practice through industry-specific licensing schemes.1 In the six states
that do not license public adjusting,2 however, there remains the risk that state authorities will
conclude that the profession as a whole, by its very nature, constitutes the unauthorized practice
of law. Arkansas, and until very recently, Kansas, flatly prohibits public adjusting on this basis.
Blanket prohibitions of public adjusting are not only unfair to the industry, but they also
work an injustice upon policyholders whose claims do not involve questions of law. In contrast
to public adjusters, who typically charge contingency fees of approximately ten to twenty percent
of the amount recovered by the policyholder, the standard contingency fee for attorneys is thirtythree percent, regardless of the complexity of the claim. Allowing a legal monopoly on public
adjusting activities thus obliges policyholders to pay higher fees for legal representation where
the services of a non-attorney adjuster would be sufficient, if not preferable.
The aim of this paper is to identify the most effective legal arguments for challenging
prohibitions of public adjusting under the pretense of state unauthorized practice of law (UPL)
regulation. As the vast majority of states have recognized,3 first-party public adjusting4—
defined broadly as assisting an insured in the settlement of claims for property loss or damages
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Brian S. Goodman, PROPERTY INSURANCE LITIGATOR’S HANDBOOK 42 (2007). Since the publication of this
article, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, and Mississippi have enacted public adjusting licensing provisions. Kansas’s licensing
law, which was signed by the Governor on April 13, 2009, will enter into effect on July 1, 2009.
2

These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin.

3

See infra Part II.B.

4

State prohibitions of third-party public adjusting, which may be defined as “represent[ing] a stranger to the
insurance contract on a claim asserted against a tortfeaser,” Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes & Haden, 905 P.2d 867,
868 (Utah 1995), are beyond the scope of this paper. Courts have consistently found third-party adjusting, which is
based upon principles of tort law, to constitute the practice of law. Id. at 868–70.
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under an insurance contract5—does not require specialized legal skills or knowledge, and as
such, does not in and of itself constitute the practice of law. Of course, individual adjusters may
engage in activities amounting to unauthorized practice, but questions as to the lawfulness of
their conduct must be determined on a case-by-case basis. As will be discussed, states may not
use UPL provisions, either directly or indirectly, to completely bar public adjusters from
practicing within their borders.
To contextualize this analysis, this paper is divided into three main parts. Part I discusses
as background the history, justifications for, and limitations of, state UPL regulation. Part II
introduces the problems that may arise in the grey area between the practice of law and the
business of public adjusting and outlines current state practice regarding the treatment of public
adjusters under UPL doctrine. Building upon this discussion, Part III presents four potential
legal challenges to blanket prohibitions of public adjusting.
I.

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW—GENERALLY
A. Background and Justification
At the onset of the Great Depression, the American Bar Association, driven at least in

part by a desire to curtail outside competition,6 created a committee on unauthorized practice and
launched a nation-wide effort to encourage state regulation of UPL. By the 1960s, every state
bar association in the country had a committee investigating instances of unauthorized practice.7
Today, every state restricts the practice of law to individuals licensed as attorneys.8

5

NAIC Model Laws, Regulations and Guidelines 228-1, § 2

6

J.W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 323 (1950).

7

STANLEY A. BASS, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE SOURCEBOOK (1965).

8

Most states, either by statute, caselaw, court rules, or a combination of thereof, permit injunctive suits to bar
unauthorized practice. LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 637
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The regulation of UPL is justified on the basis that it protects the public from “being
advised or represented in legal matters by incompetent or unreliable persons.”9 This concern is
underscored by the fact that clients are often not in a position to judge whether they are receiving
proper professional attention.10 In recent years, however, scholars have become increasingly
critical of the consumer protection rationale. First, they argue, many of the tasks frequently
regarded by courts as the practice of law, such as the preparation of loan and title documents, for
example, do not require formal legal training.11 Secondly, they contend that UPL doctrine
erroneously assumes that clients are incapable of deciding for themselves whether it is in their
best interest to pay higher fees for a lawyer as opposed to a non-lawyer specialist.12 These
criticisms are especially relevant in the context of public adjusting.
B. Defining the “Practice of Law”
The most significant (and also most perplexing) aspect UPL regulation is the lack of a
single, uniform definition of the “practice of law.” Efforts by the American Bar Association to
create a model definition have failed,13 and most courts addressing the subject have concluded

(2005). Such conduct is punishable as a crime in at least twenty-seven states. Survey of Unauthorized Practice
Committees, ABA Standing Committee on Client Protection (2009), at 2.
9

Huls v. Criger, 247 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1952). Other suggested justifications for UPL regulation include ensuring
the effective administration of justice and providing an economic incentive for trained lawyers to submit to
professional regulation. Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the
Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2594 (1982).
10

Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Considerations 3-4 (1981).

11

See Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 708 (1977).

12

See Denckla, supra note 9 at 2595.

13

ABA Group Opts Not to Set Model Definition, 19 ABA/BNA LAW. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT 212 (2003).
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that a precise definition is both undesirable and practically impossible.14 As a consequence, this
task has been left to the states, most of which define “practice of law” as broadly as possible.15
In the absence of a workable definition of “practice of law,” state courts have employed a
variety of tests to determine the scope of state UPL provisions. The most common of these tests
include: the “Professional Judgment” test, which considers whether the activities in question
require specialized legal skills or knowledge;16 the “Traditional Area of Practice” test, which
defines the practice of law as activities traditionally performed by lawyers;17 the “Incidental to
Non-Law Activity” test, which excludes from the practice of law activities regularly performed
by nonlawyers as an incident to another commercial transaction;18 and the “Public Interest” test,
whereby courts weigh the public interest in protecting clients from incompetent representation
against the interest in reducing the costs of professional services to consumers.19
Against this backdrop, three broad and non-exclusive categories of activities have
commonly been found to constitute the practice of law: representing or advocating on behalf of
another, particularly before a judicial tribunal or administrative agency; preparing legal

14

See, e.g. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962) (defining the practice of law “is nigh
onto impossible . . . .”).
15

The Texas UPL statute, for example, defines the practice of law as including, among other things, “the giving of
advice or the rendering of any service requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge . . . .” TX. CODE ANN. §
81.101(a). It further provides that, “[t]he definition in this section . . . does not deprive the judicial branch of the
power . . . to determine whether other services and acts not enumerated may constitute the practice of law.” TX.
CODE. ANN. § 81.101(b).
16

See, e.g., Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 469 P.2d 353, 358 (Cal. 1970).

17

See, e.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 15 (Ariz. 1961).

18

See, e.g., Cultum v. Heritage House Realtors, Inc., 649 P.2d 630, 633 (Wash. 1985).

19

See, e.g., id. at 633–64. These and several additional tests are described in full in Derek Denckla’s article,
Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, supra note 9
at 2588–89.
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instruments or documents; and the giving of legal advice or counsel.20 Most courts agree that,
because of the abstract nature of the practice of law definition, determinations as to whether a
particular activity constitutes unauthorized practice must be made on a case-by-case basis.21
C. External Limitations
The reach of UPL regulation, and likewise the definition of “practice of law,” is guided
by three external constraints: antitrust laws;22 the constitutional guarantee of due process;23 and
the constitutional limitations on laws discriminating against interstate commerce.24
1. Antitrust Laws
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,25 the Supreme Court considered for the first time
whether the practice of law qualifies as “trade or commerce” under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Answering this question in the affirmative, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act’s
prohibition of anti-competitive restraints on trade extends to the activities of state and local bar
associations.26 A number of individuals and organizations have since, with limited success,
relied upon antitrust laws to challenge overly-broad applications of UPL doctrine.

20

See generally, Susan W. Harrell & Karen McGuffee, Common Ground? The Definition of “The Practice of Law”
in the United States, 14 PROF. LAW. 18 (2004).

21

See Oregon State Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d 344 (Or. 1962) (“In Oregon, as in many other
jurisdictions, the particularized definition of ‘the practice of law’ was committed to case-by-case development by
the courts.”).

22

See SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.

23

U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.

24

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.

25

421 U.S. 773 (1975) (striking down a minimum fee schedule for title examinations proscribed by the Fairfax
County Bar Association).

26

Id. at 785–87.
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Most notably, in Surety Title Insurance Agency v. Virginia State Bar,27 a federal district
court sustained an antitrust challenge to Virginia’s UPL procedures, under which the state’s
unauthorized practice committee, comprised entirely of lawyers, was given the authority to issue
binding advisory opinions without any participation whatsoever from non-interested parties.28
The court found that the procedures constituted an illegal boycott and an attempt to monopolize
in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, reasoning that Virginia’s process for issuing
UPL opinions “place[d] attorneys in the unique position of being able to define the extent of their
own monopoly.”29 In so concluding, the court rejected a defense raised by the Virginia Bar
under the “state action” exception to the Sherman Act, which shields conduct intended to further
official state policy from antitrust liability.30 The court explained that, even though the Virginia
Bar was authorized to regulate unauthorized practice, “the harms of the system greatly
outweigh[ed] its purported benefits.” 31
Only six months after the Eastern District’s decision in Surety Title, however, the
Supreme Court clarified the state action exception in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.32 The
Supreme Court held that an Arizona Bar disciplinary rule prohibiting advertising of legal

27

431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977); vacated and remanded, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1978). On remand, the district
court was instructed to withhold decision until the conclusion of a challenge to Virginia’s unauthorized practice
procedures raised in a Virginia state court. In the interim, Virginia revised its UPL procedures to address many of
the issues raised by the district court. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 55 (1981).
28

Surety Title, 431 F. Supp. at 308–309.

29

Id. at 308.

30

See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943) (observing that nothing in the language or history of the Sherman
Act suggests that Congress intended to restrain states from authorizing certain anticompetitive activities within their
borders).

31

Surety Title, 431 F. Supp. at 307.

32

433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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services did not violate the Sherman Act because the rule was an act of the state, was “clearly
and affirmatively expressed,” and was subject to “active” “state supervision.”33 Notably, the
Supreme Court’s analysis did not include a discussion as to whether the state’s interest in
regulating legal advertising outweighed the federal interest in insuring free and fair competition.
This omission, some scholars have argued, calls into question the validity of the balancing
approach taken in Surety Title.34
2. Due Process
Importantly, however, the court’s reasoning in Surety Title—that the Bar should be
constrained in defining the parameters of its own monopoly—is also central to the second
restraint on UPL regulation: the constitutional guarantee of due process. The Fourteenth
Amendment protects individuals against deprivations of life, liberty, and property without due
process of law, and has been interpreted as including the right to practice one’s profession.35
In Gibson v. Berryhill,36 for example, the Supreme Court affirmed an order enjoining the
Alabama Board of Optometry from initiating delicensing proceedings against certain individuals
found to have engaged in unprofessional conduct. Under Alabama Law, the Board, whose
membership was limited to independent optometrists not employed by others, was authorized to
issue and revoke licenses for the practice of optometry.37 Acting under this authority, the Board
initiated delicensing proceedings against the plaintiffs, who were licensed optometrists employed
33

Id. at 362.

34

See Rhode, supra note 27 at 54 (acknowledging these criticisms, but noting that, “On that point, no federal court
has spoken.”). At least one court has since found the state action exception available as a defense to state UPL
enforcement proceedings. See Lender's Service, Inc. v. Dayton Bar Ass'n, 758 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Ohio 1991).

35

Martin v. Stites, 203 F.Supp. 2d 1237, 1250 (D. Kan. 2002) (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492
(1959)).

36

411 U.S. 564 (1973).

37

Id. at 570 n. 7.
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by Lee Optical Co., on the basis that, by accepting employment with a corporation, they were
aiding and abetting in the unauthorized practice of optometry.38 Reasoning that, “[b]ecause . . .
the Board of Optometry’s efforts would possibly redound to the personal benefit of members of
the Board,” the Supreme Court held that the possibility of bias, either through prejudgment of the
facts or personal interest, “constitutionally disqualified” the board from entertaining
unauthorized practice charges of the type in question.39
Whether Gibson’s reasoning applies with equal force in the context of UPL regulation is
unclear. In Ferguson v. Skrupa,40 the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of a Kansas
law restricting the practice of “debt adjusting” to licensed attorneys.41 The court stated:
Unquestionably, there are arguments showing that the business of debt adjusting
has social utility, but such arguments are properly addressed to the legislature, not
to [the courts]. . . . [W]e emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts
used the Due Process Clause ‘to strike down state laws . . . because they may be
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.’42
As will be discussed in Part III.C., however, Ferguson is distinguishable from Gibson in that it
concerns the substantive, rather than procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause.
3. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The final restraint on UPL regulation is the Commerce Clause of Article 1, section 8 of
the U.S. Constitution. By vesting Congress with the authority to “regulate commerce . . . among
the states,” the Commerce Clause also forbids, by implication, “economic protectionism”
38

Id. at 567–68.

39

Id. at 587–579.

40

372 U.S. 726 (1963)

41

Id at 732–733. The statute defined “debt adjusting” as entering into a contract with a debtor “whereby the debtor
agrees to pay a certain amount of money to a [debt adjuster] who shall for a consideration distribute the same among
certain specified creditors . . . .” Id. at 727.

42

Id. at 731–32 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)).
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through “regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening outof-state competitors.”43 This aspect of Article 1, section 8 is popularly known as the “Dormant
Commerce Clause.”44
The Supreme Court has adopted a two-tiered analysis for determining the validity of state
regulations under the Dormant Commerce Clause. First, if the provision “directly regulates or
discriminates against interstate commerce,” or if “its effect is to favor in-state economic interests
over out-of state interests,”45 then it is unconstitutional unless it “promotes a legitimate state
interest that cannot be achieved through any reasonable non-discriminatory means.”46 If,
however, the provision only indirectly affects interstate commerce, then it will survive
constitutional scrutiny “unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to putative local benefits.”47
Applying this test in the context of UPL regulation, in National Revenue Corp. v. Violet48
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit struck down a Rhode Island statute which defined the
business of debt collecting as the practice of law. Deciding the case under the first prong of the
Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the court held that “a statute that
forecloses out-of-state debt collectors, en masse, from seeking to collect debts from Rhode Island
citizens imposes . . . a substantial burden [on commerce], both ‘on its face [and] in practical

43

W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 205 (1994) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 273–274 (1988)).

44

Healy, 512 U.S. at 212 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

45

Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 559 (1986) (emphasis added).

46

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).

47

Id.

48

807 F.2d 285 (1st Cir. 1986).
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effect.’”49 By limiting debt adjusting activities to members of the Rhode Island bar, the court
reasoned, the statute favored a class of individuals comprised almost exclusively of state citizens
at the expense of out-of-state debt collectors.50 The court further found that, even had Rhode
Island asserted an interest in restricting the practice of debt adjusting, which it did not, the statute
would still have been unconstitutional in light of several non-discriminatory alternatives.51
Specifically, the court pointed to the fact that twenty-seven other states regulated debt adjusting
through licensing schemes, rather than UPL doctrine.52
II.

APPLICATION OF UPL DOCTRINE TO THE BUSINESS OF PUBLIC INSURANCE
ADJUSTING
Since 1934, when unauthorized practice of law doctrine was first found to bar certain

public adjusting activities,53 various courts have wrestled with the question of whether and under
what circumstances public insurance adjusting—or, indeed, whether the entire industry—may be
regarded as the practice law.54 Using the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Professional
Adjusters, Inc. v. Tandon55 as a starting point, this section will highlight the challenges of

49

Id. at 289 (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986)); see also Real Estate Bar Association for
Massachusetts, Inc. v. National Real Estate Information Services, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31014 *25 (D. Mass.
2009).

50

Violet, 807 F.2d at 290.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582 (1934).

54

The legal issues surrounding the intersection between UPL doctrine and public adjusting arise in one of two
situations. First, state UPL committees can directly initiate injunctive proceedings against public adjusters who they
believe to be engaging in unauthorized practice. Because this process can be time consuming and expensive,
however, individual UPL enforcement actions are uncommon. Far more common is the situation where a public
adjuster has filed suit seeking the recovery of unpaid fees, and either the policyholder or his insurer challenges the
validity of the underlying contract.

55

433 N.E. 2d 779 (Ind. 1982).
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applying UPL doctrine to the business of public adjusting, and will provide an overview of how
states currently approach this issue.
A. The “Twilight Zone”: Professional Adjusters, Inc. v. Tandon
The textbook case for discussing the nexus between UPL doctrine and the business of
public insurance adjusting is Professional Adjusters, Inc. v. Tandon, which involved the validity
of a contract for the delivery of public adjusting services. As a defense to the enforcement of the
contract, the defendant, Tandon, challenged the legality of Indiana’s public adjuster licensing
statute, which authorized public adjusters to “negotiate[e] for, or effect[] the settlement of”
claims for loss or damages to property under insurance policies on behalf of an insured.56 If the
statute authorized public adjusters to engage in the practice of law in violation of the state
constitution, Tandon argued, then the underlying contract would be invalid, and the plaintiff,
Professional Adjusters, Inc. (PAI), would not be entitled to recover uncollected fees.57
In a 3–2 decision, a majority of the court found that the activities permitted under the
statute were, “pure and simple, the practice of law.”58 The court justified this conclusion on the
basis that the statute authorized public adjusters to determine rights and liabilities under
insurance contracts and to negotiate settlements—activities which, in the majority’s view,
necessarily require the interpretation of contractual terms.59 The court was not persuaded,
moreover, by the fact that PAI only made a determination of the insured’s loss and submitted a

56

IND. CODE § 27-1-24-1 (1975).

57

Tandon, 433 N.E.2d at 780

58

Id.at 782.

59

Id. at 783.

11

claim to his insurer. “The fact that the negotiations did not reach the stage where there was a
bargaining process,” the court explained, “[did] not make it any less [sic] negotiation.”60
In dissent, Justice Hunter criticized the majority’s attempt to draw a bright line between
the activities that can and cannot be performed by nonattorney public adjusters. As a practical
matter, he explained, the drawing of such a line will always be arbitrary—especially with regard
to activities such as negotiating settlements, examining damaged property, and assessing
pecuniary losses, which lie within the “twilight zone” between lawful conduct and unauthorized
practice.61 Accordingly, he concluded that, whereas the public interest in “facilitating the
expeditious settlement of [disputes]” and “placing assureds on the same footing as insurance
companies” will often outweigh concerns about incompetent representation, the court should
have evaluated the lawfulness of PAI’s activities on an individualized basis, rather than striking
down the statute in its entirety.62
B. Spread of the Pragmatic Approach
The disagreement between Tandon’s majority and dissenting opinions continues to
provoke debate. In general, while many courts agree with the majority’s conclusion that
negotiating and settling insurance claims on behalf of an insured constitutes the practice of law,
particularly when there is a coverage dispute,63 Justice Hunter’s opinion, which suggests the
need for a pragmatic, case-by-case approach to UPL determinations involving adjusting
activities, is representative of recent state trends.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 785 (Hunter, J., dissenting).

62

Id. at 786–787.

63

See, e.g. Duncan v. Gordon, 476 So.2d 896 (La. 1985); Gross v. Reliance Ins. Co., 462 N.Y.W.2d 776 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1983); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Cromwell, 695 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio 1998).
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Two concurrent developments in public adjusting and UPL regulation explain the shift
toward a pragmatic approach. Most significantly, the vast majority of states have enacted public
adjuster licensing statutes.64 And while it is true that, just because an activity is licensed does
mean that it is exempt from UPL regulation, since it is the duty of courts, not legislatures, to
regulate the practice of law,65 courts are unlikely to bar an entire profession when their state
legislature has determined that the public is adequately protected through a comprehensive
licensing scheme.66 Instead, consistent with the growing consensus among the courts that it is
both impossible and undesirable to define precisely what is, and what is not, the “practice of
law,” 67 most courts would agree that the determination of whether a public adjuster has engaged
in unauthorized practice “is best decided in the context of an actual case or controversy.”68
C. Blanket Prohibitions of Public Adjusting
Nevertheless, at least one state, Arkansas, continues to regard public adjusting as
unlawful under any circumstances. Under Arkansas law, individuals who are “licensed as an
adjuster or employed as an adjuster by an insurer” are specifically exempted from the state’s
unauthorized practice statute.69 Significantly, however, the Arkansas Insurance Code defines an
“adjuster” as “an individual . . . who . . . investigates and negotiates, on behalf of the insurer,
64

See Goodman, supra note 1 at 42.

65

See Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Ariz. 120 P.3d 1092, 1099 (2005) (“Although the legislature
may, by statute, regulate the practice of law, such regulation cannot be inconsistent with the mandates of this
Court.”).

66

See Gross, 119 Misc.2d at 272.

67

See supra notes 13–21 and accompanying text.

68

See Linder v. Insurance Claims Consultants, Inc , 560 S.E.2d 612, 618 (S.C. 2002) (citing In re Unauthorized
Practice of Law Rules, 309 S.C. 304, 305 (1992)). In addition to negotiations involving coverage issues, there are
certain adjusting activities which courts have routinely found to constitute the practice of law, such as advising
policyholders of their legal rights, duties, or privileges and advising whether or not to settle their claim. Id. at 621.

69

ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16–22–501.
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settlement of claims arising under insurance contracts.”70 Adjusters who work on behalf of
policyholders are ineligible for licenses and thus subject to state unauthorized practice laws.
Accordingly, Arkansas insurance officials have concluded that public adjusting, as a profession,
constitutes the practice of law.71
Arkansas is not unique. Of the five other states that do not license public adjusters, two
of these states have licensing requirements for insurance company adjusters.72 Like Arkansas,
these states may eventually conclude that, by licensing insurance company adjusters but not
public adjusters, their legislatures intended to completely prohibit public adjusting as the
unauthorized practice of law. Likewise, the three states that do not license any type of adjusting
activities may also conclude that public adjusting is illegal.73 Indeed, until very recently, Kansas
maintained that public adjusting was prohibited, despite the fact that its state law made no
specific reference to adjusters of any kind.74
III.

POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES TO BLANKET PROHIBITIONS OF PUBLIC
INSURANCE ADJUSTING
As most states have recognized, the most effective way to ensure that the public receives

both the benefits of public insurance adjusting and adequate protection against unscrupulous
adjusting practices is to adopt state licensing requirements. Until such time as every state
licenses public adjusters, however, action must be taken to ensure that they are allowed to
70

ARK. CODE. ANN. § 23–64–102(4)(A) (emphasis added).

71

See Arkansas Insurance Consumers Warned of Illegal Property Adjusters, Ark. Ins. Dep. Press Release (August
24, 1999) (“It’s akin to practicing law without a license.”) The state encourages consumers to report “illegal
activities of public adjusters,” whose names are forwarded to the Arkansas Supreme Court. Id.

72

See AL. CODE. ANN. § 27–9–1, et seq.; AK. STAT. ANN. § 21.27.010, et seq.

73

These states include: South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin.

74

Public insurance adjusters not permitted in Kansas, Kansas Ins. Dep. Press Release (Dec. 19, 2007). On April
13, 2009, Kansas signed into law the Kansas Public Adjusters Licensing Act, which will go into effect in July 2009.
See H.B. 2052 (Kan. 2009).
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practice anywhere in the country. In practice, this means that states must apply UPL doctrine
pragmatically and evaluate the conduct of public adjusters on a case-by-case basis. With this
goal in mind, this section will analyze four potential legal challenges to blanket prohibitions of
public adjusting.75
A. Challenging the State’s Interpretation of the Law
The first and most basic way to challenge blanket prohibitions of public adjusting is to
seek a declaration, either from a court or the state’s unauthorized practice committee, that the
state (most likely the insurance commissioner) has misinterpreted its unauthorized practice laws.
No state in the country, including Arkansas, specifically defines public adjusting as the practice
of law. Rather, as discussed above,76 this conclusion may only be reached by reading state laws
as impliedly prohibiting non-attorneys from assisting policyholders in the settlement of insurance
claims. This interpretation is strongest when the state licenses or exempts from UPL regulation
insurance company adjusters, but not public adjusters.
An equally persuasive argument can be made, however, that the fact that a statutory
scheme makes no reference to public adjusting implies only that the profession should be
allowed, subject to the possibility that individual adjusters may be punished for specific instances
of unauthorized practice. This interpretation, which has been applied to laws of this type in
Alaska,77 is consistent with the pragmatic approach most states now apply to UPL doctrine.

75

These arguments presuppose that, either the state’s justification for the prohibition is grounded upon a belief that
public adjusting, as a profession, constitutes the practice of law, or that the state, as an act of in-state protectionism,
has limited public adjusting activities to members of the state bar. Were a state to completely prohibit public
adjusting by attorneys and non-attorneys alike, the courts are not likely to interfere. See generally Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963).

76

See supra Part II.C.

77

Frequently Asked Questions, Alaska Div. of Ins. (“[W]hile public adjusters are not licensed under the insurance
law, licensing may be required under other provisions of Alaska laws. In particular, public adjusting may constitute
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Additionally, it is also the most sensible interpretation in light of the fact that insurance company
adjusters, who handle claims from beginning to end, are more likely than public adjusters to
participate in negotiations involving coverage disputes.78
B. A Legal Monopoly?
Should an unauthorized practice committee conclude that public adjusting is akin to the
practice of law, such a determination may be challenged under federal antitrust laws.
Specifically, it may be argued that the state’s UPL procedures, to the extent that they empower a
committee comprised exclusively of lawyers to limit the entire profession of public adjusting to
members of the bar, constitute an illegal boycott and attempt to monopolize under Sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act.
The crux of an argument based upon antitrust law will be the “state action” exception,
which exempts anticompetitive state regulations from antitrust liability where: (1) the regulation
is “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy;”79 and (2) the policy is
“actively supervised by the state itself.”80 To overcome this defense, it should be argued that the
policy of the state, as embodied in its unauthorized practice laws, is simply to authorize UPL
committees to make individualized determinations of liability, not to empower them to define an

the practice of law and, therefore, may require a license to practice law depending on the nature and scope of the
activities performed . . . .”) (emphasis added), available at http://www.commerce.state.ak.us/insurance/pub/faq.pdf.
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Policyholders whose claims involve coverage disputes are likely to seek the aid of an attorney rather than a public
adjuster. Moreover, when coverage issues arise, public adjusters will recommend that the client retain council. See
Goodman, supra note 1 at 44.
79

Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. U.S., 471 U.S. 48, 57 (1985). As noted in Lender's Service, Inc. v.
Dayton Bar Ass'n, even though UPL committees are comprised of private parties, since their authority flows from
the state’s highest court, their actions are “deemed in effect acts of the state itself.” 758 F. Supp. 429, 435 (S.D.
Ohio 1991).
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Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
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entire profession as the practice of law.81 It should further be argued that the harm of vesting
UPL committees with such authority significantly outweighs the state’s interest in protecting
consumers from incompetent representation.82
There are two weaknesses to this argument. First, courts have interpreted the “clear
articulation” requirement as demanding only that the regulation be a reasonable and foreseeable
exercise of authority vested by the state.83 By defining the practice of law broadly, it will be
argued, the legislature intended UPL committees to have wide discretion in declaring certain
activities as unlawful. Additionally, as a matter of policy, the state action exception is rooted in
concerns about federal interference with state matters. As noted in Bates, “the regulation of the
activities of the bar is at the core of the state’s power to protect the public.”84 Thus, the state
action exception will likely be a significant obstacle to a challenge under antitrust law.85
C. Procedural Due Process and the Deprivation of the Right to Practice One’s
Profession
Nonetheless, the core argument in support of an antitrust challenge—that a committee
comprised solely of lawyers may not restrict the entire profession of public adjusting to members
of the bar—can easily be recast as a due process challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As explained by the court in Surety Title,86 it is “offensive to notions of basic fairness” to allow a
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See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975) (“[W]e need not inquire further into the state-action
question because it cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia through its Supreme Court Rules required the
anticompetitive activities of either respondent.”).
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See Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298, 307 (E.D. Va. 1977).
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Lender’s Service, Inc. v. Dayton Bar Ass’n, 758 F.Supp. 429 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (citing Hybud Equipment Corp. v.
City of Akron, 742 F.2d 949 (1984)).
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Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977).
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An important limitation of this argument is that it applies only to decisions by UPL committees. In Arkansas, for
example, it is the state’s insurance department that has equated public adjusting with the practice of law.
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See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.
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group with a “direct pecuniary interest” in establishing an “expansive definition of the practice of
law” to deprive an entire class of individuals of their right to practice their profession.87 This is
especially true given the availability of an alternative procedure that promises to be fairer to the
parties involved: individualized determinations.88
Again, there are two potential obstacles to this argument. First, it may be argued that
blanket prohibitions do not entirely preclude public adjusters from practicing their profession—
they can still work for insurers.89 It is not so clear, however, that the constitutional right to
practice one’s profession is so limited.90 As an illustration, imagine the response one would
receive upon telling a state public defender that, although she can no longer represent criminal
defendants, she can always work for the prosecution. In both cases, compelling arguments may
be made as to how the professions differ.
The second obstacle is the Ferguson decision, where the Supreme Court upheld a Kansas
statute defining debt adjusting as the practice of law.91 Significantly, however, Ferguson dealt
only with the narrow substantive issue of whether the Due Process Clause prohibits state
legislatures from determining that, in the interest of the public, certain business practices must be
performed by an attorney. By contrast, arguments based upon Gibson and Surety Title concern
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Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F.Supp. 298, 308 (1977); see Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564, 578–579 (1973). See also Rhode, supra note 27 at 51 (observing that “The very concept of due process
presupposes a dispassionate decisionmaker . . . .”).
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See Guy M. Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1463 (1967). Individual determinations are fairer because they afford individual adjusters the opportunity to argue
that their conduct, under the circumstances, did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Additionally, they
minimize the possibility of bias by watering down committee members’ personal interest in the outcome of the
decision.
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See State ex rel. Stovall v. Martinez, 375 Kan. App. 2d, 9, 13 (Kan. 2000).
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See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges, et al. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1973) (recognizing a right “to engage in
any of the common occupations of life”).
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the procedural guarantees of due process, such as the right to a fair and impartial hearing when
one’s life, liberty, or property is at stake. Thus, although Ferguson spoke to directly to the issue
of overly-broad UPL regulation under the Due Process Clause, it has no bearing on the extent to
which due process demands certain procedural safeguards when depriving one of their right to
practice their profession.
D. Challenging Blanket Prohibitions as a Form of Economic Protectionism
The final and strongest argument against blanket prohibitions of public insurance
adjusting derives from the Dormant Commerce Clause’s limitation on in-state economic
protectionism. By labeling the entire profession of public adjusting as the practice of law,
including activities that, standing alone, do not require the application legal skills or knowledge,
blanket prohibitions “place an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.”92 First, such
prohibitions directly discriminate against out-of-state competition by conferring the exclusive
right to provide public adjusting services—and to reap the associated economic benefits—upon
the members of state bar associations,93 which are comprised almost entirely of in-state
residents.94 Secondly, the state’s interest in protecting the public against incompetent
representation can be achieved through non-discriminatory means: state licensing requirements.95
Arguably, the interstate effects of protectionist measures are not as great in the public
adjusting context as they are in the debt collecting context, which was the focus of the First
92

See Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc. v. National Real Estate Information Services, (REBA)
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31014 *25 (D. Mass. 2009) (enjoining REBA from defining real estate conveyancing as the
practice of law).
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See National Revenue Corp. v. Violet, 807 F.2d 285, 290 (1st Cir. 1986).
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REBA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *31 (“REBA contends that . . . [UPL doctrine] ‘applies even-handedly against
all non-attorneys, whether they reside in Massachusetts or they reside out-of-state.’ This argument is flawed,
however, because the majority of individuals who are licensed to practice law in Massachusetts would undoubtedly
also be Massachusetts residents.”).
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Circuit’s decision in Violet.96 No doubt, the anticompetitive effects of limiting the practice of
debt collecting to in-state lawyers would be severe; national businesses frequently rely on such
services.97 The effect of similar restrictions on public adjusting, however, should not be
discounted. For example, in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, had Louisiana not lifted
its ban on non-attorney public adjusting,98 thousands of consumers would have been forced to
make a costly choice between hiring a local attorney (assuming an attorney would have been
available) and settling their claims without the assistance of an expert. In any event, any counterarguments are likely to be mitigated by the fact that forty-three of fifty states have found it
sufficient to regulate the profession through comprehensive licensing schemes.
IV.

CONCLUSION
In sum, by pushing for uniform state licensing procedures, the public insurance adjusting

industry is on the right track toward securing national uniformity in the treatment of public
adjusters under state UPL provisions. In the meantime, however, public adjusters must be
assured that they can practice anywhere in the country without the risk of civil or criminal
liability. To this end, this paper has presented four legal bases upon which to challenge blanket
prohibitions of public adjusting. Considered collectively, these arguments are likely to weigh
heavily on a state court’s interpretation of a broadly-worded UPL statute. Independently, they
each highlight from a different angle the unfairness of treating the profession of public insurance
adjusting and the “practice of law” as one and the same.
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